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Abstract 
 
Performance Funding 2.0  
in Higher Education 
Sean Anthony Griffin, M.P.Aff. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Paul von Hippel 
 
As tuition and student debt at public institutions of higher education have grown 
substantially over the last decade, state governments have looked increasingly to 
performance funding programs to incentivize the efficient delivery of higher education, 
particularly by decreasing time-to-degree. Even with hundreds of millions of dollars 
devoted to these efforts, however, it remains unclear whether the programs have a 
significant impact on an institution's operations and student outcomes or rather, for 
example, they simply reward those institutions which were already most able to meet the 
program's goals and which enroll the best prepared students. Initial performance funding 
systems that awarded institutions with additional funding for meeting outcomes goals 
have not been shown to be effective in impacting degree completions. In this paper I 
analyze whether new models of performance funding that tie performance to a portion of 
base formula funding, dubbed 2.0, are better at incentivizing institutions to increase 
degree completion. Considering the myriad influences on student success (and, 
 v 
consequently, graduation rates), it is questionable whether the incentives provided by 
these programs are sufficient alone to positively influence improvements to graduation 
rates. Accordingly, it may be more effective for states that desire increased graduation 
rates and reduced student loan debt to appropriate funds to direct measures of controlling 
tuition costs—such as increased financial aid tied to timely graduation—than to fund 
performance funding programs. 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................ vii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter One:  Introduction ......................................................................................1 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review ............................................................................3 
Chapter Three:  Design ..........................................................................................10 
Chapter Four:  Data ................................................................................................12 
Chapter Five:  Methods ..........................................................................................14 
Chapter Six:  Results ..............................................................................................16 
Impact on Degrees Awarded .........................................................................22 
Impact from Characteristics ..........................................................................25 
Controlling for Institution Size .....................................................................28 
Chapter Seven:  Discussion and Conclusion .........................................................32 
References ..............................................................................................................34 
 vii 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Status of performance funding systems by state, 2004-2015. ..........13 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics .........................................................................17 
Table 3:     Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding Systems  
on Undergraduate Degrees Awarded ................................................23 
Table 4:      Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding System  
Age and Percent of Funding Implicated on Undergraduate  
Degrees Awarded ..............................................................................26 
Table 5:      Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding Systems  
on the Logarithmic Equivalent of Undergraduate Degrees  
Awarded ............................................................................................29 
Table 6:      Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding System  
Age and Percent of Funding Implicated on the Logarithmic  
Equivalent of Undergraduate Degrees Awarded ..............................30 
 viii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Average number of degrees awarded annually in states with and  
without performance funding systems. .............................................20 
Figure 2: Average four-year graduation rates in states with and without 
performance funding systems. ..........................................................21 
Figure 3: Average six-year graduation rates in states with and without 
performance funding systems. ..........................................................22 
  
 1 
Chapter One:  Introduction 
In the United States there is a growing chorus from political leaders and higher 
education policymakers who argue that higher education institutions must become more 
efficient, specifically in graduating students timely and with manageable student loan 
debt. With limited tools to direct higher education policy other than funding, states have 
increasingly turned to performance funding to incentivize desired policy goals. 
Currently, 37 states have some form of performance funding for higher education 
at either the two-year or four-year institution level. Earlier performance funding policies 
awarded additional funding above base operational appropriations according to 
performance metrics. Examinations of these programs revealed little evidence of a 
positive causal impact. A second wave of policy adoption now underway embeds 
performance funding into the base funding formula. But because of fluctuations in states' 
policies and leadership, which make long-term impact assessment difficult, conclusive 
empirical evidence regarding performance funding remains limited. 
A particularly vexing problem in analyzing the impact of performance funding 
programs is the difficulty in identifying and controlling the myriad and complex variables 
and mechanisms apart from funding that affect the outcomes being studied. Though some 
have studied the impact from the magnitude of the incentive funding or the type of 
institution, the variety of performance funding programs themselves may confound 
successful analysis. Such variance includes how much funding is tied to the program, 
whether that funding is inside or outside of base operational funding formulas, which 
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performance metrics are the focus of the funding, and how long the program has been in 
place, among others. 
In this paper, I examine how these differences might affect the success or failure 
of performance funding programs in institutions of higher education. I do this by 
categorizing and comparing discrete groups of performance funding programs so that the 
relationship between certain programs and their outcomes can be assessed individually, 
with the intention that such differentiation might reveal greater insight into the true 
impacts of these programs. 
Although this approach should provide a more accurate representation of the 
potential for performance funding to be successful, it is likely that there will continue to 
be unaccounted for complexities inherent in higher education delivery that hinder the 
ability of any performance funding to be instrumental in causing desired outcomes. 
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
Using the Academic Search Complete database, I conducted a search for articles 
and other published material with the keywords “performance-based funding,” 
“performance funding,” and “higher education.” An examination of the results from this 
search and cross-referenced citations within the results revealed forays into an array of 
different issues associated with performance funding. For the purposes of this paper, I 
restrict the literature review to analyses and discussions related specifically to four-year 
general academic institutions and omit inquiries into performance funding at the 
community college level.  
Performance-based accountability, which in a general sense refers to a system that 
assesses programs or activities directly by measuring objective desired outcomes, has 
been in existence and utilized to varying degrees for at least the last century. This broad 
approach to accountability can take several related but distinct forms that have evolved 
over time. Performance reporting simply requires an entity to report data about its 
performance outcomes to decision-makers. Performance budgeting utilizes such data to 
help inform budget decisions, providing decision-makers with a basis upon which to 
determine appropriate levels of funding. Performance funding provides the most concrete 
connection between funding levels and performance by linking the allocation of funds 
directly to measures of performance (Shah & Shin, 2007). In the realm of higher 
education, for example, states or individual institutions may appropriate or allocate 
funding based on improvements in four-year graduation rates, student retention from one 
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year to the next, or the growth in the number of degrees awarded. Because performance 
funding creates a discrete relationship between how an entity performs and the level of 
funding it will receive, it is appealing to policymakers who want to implement strong 
accountability measures. It also is relatively straightforward to assess the success of a 
performance funding program because the outcomes the program is intended to produce 
are identified specifically by the program.  
To make sense of and properly assess the state of the literature, it is important to 
distinguish between two separate waves of performance funding in higher education. 
Starting with the very first implementation of a performance funding program in 
Tennessee in 1979 and continuing, slowly and in fits and starts, through to approximately 
the turn of the last century, these programs typically authorized state legislatures to 
provide an additional amount of funding beyond standard operational formula funding to 
reward institutions for meeting desired performance goals (Dougherty et al, 2014). 
What’s more, these “bonus” awards often were only a small fraction of the total state 
funding for an institution, sometimes as little as only one percent and not greater than six 
percent (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013).  
This first wave of policy implementation, which is commonly referred to as 
“performance funding 1.0,” was driven largely by institutions and higher education 
coordinating boards searching for increased funding and aided by political policymakers 
intent on inserting the semblance of accountability into higher education funding 
(Dougherty et al, 2013). As a result, one might expect the causal impact of these 
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programs on the purported goals to be weak at best since relatively little incentive is 
presented to change institutional behavior. 
Indeed, the literature studying performance funding 1.0 programs does not 
support the conclusion that such programs are effective in their nominal purpose. 
Individual quantitative case studies of performance-based funding programs implemented 
at the University of Minnesota (Hearn, et al, 2006) and in the state of South Dakota 
(Martinez and Nilson, 2006) have found these programs to be somewhat successful. They 
are limited, however, in their scope because they fail to compare the performance of these 
individual institutions impacted by the specific state program with similar peer 
institutions in other states that are not participating in a performance-based funding 
program. 
A number of studies that analyzed longitudinal data across institutions in all fifty 
states found that performance funding 1.0 did not have a positive impact on desired 
outcomes, although the studies take care to note that the relatively short age of most 
states' programs and a myriad of other confounding factors at the institution and state 
level make definitive conclusions difficult. Volkwein and Tandberg (2008) studied 
institutions in all 50 states using a cross sectional time series analysis of data from 2000-
2006 and found that performance funding program did not have a significant positive 
impact on completion rates. Similarly, Shin and Milton (2004) analyzed multiple states 
and also concluded that performance funding did not impact graduation rates.  
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies of this issue analyzed 
performance funding impacts on graduation, persistence, and degree attainment through a 
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longitudinal study of more than 500 institutions in all fifty states over 18 years and 
concluded there was no impact and, in fact, some evidence that there was a negative 
impact on graduation rates after seven years (Rutherford and Rabovsky, 2014). It is 
difficult to draw from this study any definitive conclusions about performance funding as 
a concept because of the substantial variance between the individual performance funding 
programs, both over time and between states. 
Given the scarcity of definitive evidence of the positive impact of these original 
performance funding programs in higher education, many studies have taken a qualitative 
analysis approach to attempt to explain why these programs would fail to achieve their 
desired results. Some present neo-institutionalism arguments which suggest that the 
particular culture within a higher education institution, including its history and mission, 
may prevent funding incentives from being effective (Brennan and Shah, 2000). Another 
explanation is that the inherent complexity of the higher education system makes it 
entirely unfit for incentive funding based on performance outcomes (Nisar, 2015).  
Fortunately, certain qualitative theories give reason to be optimistic about the 
potential for the right kind of performance funding system to be effective. One theory 
that supports this possibility is resource dependence theory, which postulates that the 
impact of performance funding programs is related to the degree to which the institutions 
impacted are dependent upon the amount of funding involved. Sanford and Hunter (2011) 
support this rationale and conclude that performance funding programs fail when they do 
not increase overall funding. We also will see this concept explored more later as it 
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relates to more recent forms of performance funding that implicate a greater percent of 
total state funding. 
Some quantitative analytical studies corroborate this argument. For example, 
while Rutherford and Rabovsky (2014) found that traditional performance funding 
programs have little, and perhaps a negative, impact on graduation rates, they found some 
evidence that newer models which base performance on an increased portion of core 
funding might have a more positive effect. 
Similarly, Tandberg and Hillman (2014) also found little evidence that 
performance funding increased degree completion on average. They did conclude, 
however, that there is a positive association for programs that persist for seven years or 
more, indicating that performance funding efficacy may depend less on the amount of 
funding involved or the metrics measured and more on the duration of the program.  
What these and other later studies address, and find some limited signs of 
effectiveness for, is a revised form of incentive-based funding dubbed “performance 
funding 2.0.” This new wave of program implementation began in the late 2000’s, after 
the last national economic downturn, and is characterized by programs that incorporate 
the conditional funding directly into an institution’s base operations funding, as opposed 
to rewarding institutions with additional funding outside of their normal funding formulas 
(Dougherty, et. al., 2014). In contrast to the first programs which largely were driven by 
institutions and coordinating boards searching for additional funding, adoption of 
performance funding 2.0 programs is promoted heavily by state governors and other 
political policymakers focusing sharply on accountability and efficiency, especially in the 
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context of decreased state financial support for higher education as a share of institutions’ 
total funding (Dougherty, et. al., 2014). This second, more mature evolution of the 
performance funding concept also has been bolstered by the support of several policy 
organizations, including the Gates Foundation, Lumina, and Complete College America 
(Dougherty, et al., 2014). 
Though different from performance funding 1.0 programs in the critical aspect of 
the percent of funding at stake dependent on performance measures, the limited number 
of studies that have examined these programs have not yet revealed that performance 
funding 2.0 programs are any more effective than the older performance based programs. 
Hillman and colleagues (2014) analyzed Pennsylvania’s system using a difference in 
differences analysis with comparisons to neighboring states’ institutions and institutions 
with similar characteristics and found no evidence that the program increased degree 
completions. They theorized that institutions might not be capable of improving their 
degree completions, no matter what effort or motivation employed, because institutions 
may lack the capacity to improve beyond current performance (Hillman et al., 2014). 
As this review indicates, there is a general consensus that performance funding 
1.0 programs in higher education do not produce the desired outcomes, even if it is not 
clear why this is so. Less obvious, however, is whether the modern iteration, performance 
funding 2.0, can be more effective. There is some evidence that by making larger 
portions of core funding contingent on performance measures, these programs can 
produce a positive impact (Rutherford and Rabovsky, 2014). There also is evidence, 
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though mixed, that when programs are continued for more than seven years, they begin to 
show signs of effectiveness (Tandberg and Hillman, 2014). 
While some comprehensive, longitudinal studies include both performance 
funding 1.0 and 2.0 in their analysis, there is a gap in the literature for a precise 
examination of the degree to which the primary factor in 2.0 programs, the proportion of 
funding in the base operations formula tied to outcomes, impacts effectiveness. Studies 
which simply categorize a state’s program as either 1.0 or 2.0 fail to account for the vast 
differences within 2.0 systems: some 2.0 systems utilize only a marginal portion of base 
funding while others tie an institution’s entire amount of state funding directly to 
performance outcomes. What’s more, since the literature has unveiled some evidence that 
performance funding 1.0 programs may impact outcomes positively only after seven 
years of continuous implementation, we may just now be reaching the right time to 
evaluate the new wave of performance funding which began in the late 2000’s. 
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Chapter Three:  Design 
 
Previous studies have compared higher education outcomes nationally between 
states with performance-based funding and those without. Not all performance-based 
funding programs, however, are the same. Performance funding 1.0 and 2.0 differ 
markedly in the degree to which necessary base funding is made contingent on 
performance, with 1.0 implicating only additional, bonus funding. What’s more, even 
within performance funding 2.0 there is a substantial range of the portion of base funding 
tied to the program, from a small percentage to the entire amount. While overall 
differences in the amount of state funding as a percentage of overall funding have been 
considered, the literature does not include a specific assessment of how the range of 
contingent funding in 2.0 programs influences whether those programs will be effective.  
This design proposes to address this major deficiency by differentiating between 
2.0 programs through including variables to account for the variety of percentage of 
overall funding associated with each. This should strengthen previous studies by 
controlling for the different approaches of the programs instead of conflating them and 
potentially skewing the analysis of their impact. 
Specifically, I examine each performance funding program based on whether it 
offers funding inside or outside of the formulas. I then note of those that offer funding 
inside of the formulas what percent of the total funding is impacted. A difference in 
differences comparison is conducted between institutions in states that do not have any 
performance funding program, those who still retain a performance funding 1.0 system, 
 11 
and for institutions in states with varying degrees of core formula funding impacted by 
their performance funding 2.0 programs.  
I control for both known and unknown state and institutional characteristics. For 
example, I control for common covariates that impact student performance, such as 
college readiness and demographics, and common institutional characteristics that would 
also impact performance, such as the type of institution. In addition, I account for 
unknown variables using fixed effects both for within institutions and over time across all 
institutions.  
Even controlling for these specific program characteristics, however, some 
limitations will remain. For example, even within performance funding programs that 
implicate the same portion of core operational funding, the individual metrics used to 
measure performance may vary. What’s more, some programs focus on mandatory 
metrics, others allow institutions to tailor their participation by choosing from a suite of 
metrics, while still others use some combination of mandatory and optional metrics. 
Some performance funding programs measure milestones (like the number of students 
who complete 30, 60, or 90 semester credit hours), and some strictly focus on ultimate 
outputs (that is, degrees awarded). Accordingly, the characteristics of the program 
beyond the funding component may have a significant impact on whether the program is 
successful. Further study would focus on individual categories of programs and how their 
specific characteristics impact their performance. 
  
 12 
Chapter Four:  Data 
 
This study uses data from 547 public, four-year, baccalaureate-awarding 
institutions in all fifty states to evaluate the effectiveness of different levels of the portion 
of base formula funding used in a state’s performance funding 2.0 program. Data is taken 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) and covers the years 2005-2015.  
Because every performance funding program includes either a metric for degree 
completions or one for graduation rates (which directly impacts the number of degree 
completions), I chose bachelor degree awards as the performance output to serve as the 
dependent variable. Covariates were used to control for confounding effects from 
students and institutions. 
Student-specific covariates included key student demographic measures known to 
impact degree completion, including economic status—as indicated by Pell Grant 
distributions—race, and ethnicity. SAT and ACT scores also were included to account for 
college readiness. Institution covariates included the Carnegie classification of the 
institution to control for the institutions’ missions and focus and the selectivity of the 
institution in terms of admissions per applicants. 
Finally, to account for the differences between the portion of base funding 
allocated in a state’s performance funding system, I used the National Conference of 
State Legislatures survey of performance funding programs by state and researched 
individual states to determine when these programs were implemented. This produced 
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two sets of variables, one to indicate the years a state’s program has been in effect and 
another to indicate the level of funding associated with a state’s program. 
As shown in Table 1, 24 states have never implemented a performance funding 
program and 26 states have some form of one currently. Four states have switched from 
performance funding 1.0 to performance funding 2.0, and nine states have adopted a 
program in just the last two years for which data is available in the study: six of those are 
2.0 programs and three are 1.0 programs.  
Table 1: Status of performance funding systems by state, 2004-2015. 
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Chapter Five:  Methods 
 
Regression analyses were conducted to compare institutions in states with other 
institutions based on the existence of a performance funding program (either 1.0 or 2.0), 
and an analysis of the impact of the age of a program and, for 2.0 programs, the level of 
funding within the base formula that is contingent on performance. Four sets of four 
general models were used, each of which measured the impact of sets of independent 
variables on the dependent variable of annual undergraduate degrees awarded. The first 
set of models included a dummy variable to indicate the presence of a 1.0 or 2.0 
performance funding program as the base variables, and the second set, which analyzed a 
performance funding program’s age and percent of funding implicated in the formula, 
used those two base variables. The third and fourth sets of models repeated this analysis, 
but substituted a logarithmic equivalent of degrees awarded to control for the disparate 
impact that increases in total degrees awarded have based on the relative size of the 
institutions.  
Model 1 for each set included only the base variables. Subsequent models 
included the base variables and added possibly relevant covariates. Model 2 included the 
base variables and variables related to student body characteristics, specifically total 
enrollment, percentage of enrollment made up of four major race and ethnic groups 
(Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White), and admissions rate (as a measure of selectivity). 
Model 3 included the base variables and variables related to funding, specifically state 
appropriations for instruction and operations, the percentage of that funding as compared 
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to total revenues, the total revenues, and the amount of funding expended for instruction 
and for research. Model 4 combined all of these variables. 
All models utilized fixed effects to control for unknown confounding variables 
within institutions and across time and improve internal validity. Institutional 
characteristics controlled for in this manner and through a cluster fixed effect included 
those specific to an institution that do not change over time, such as mission and culture. 
Time-based fixed effects for each year also were included to control for outside forces 
such as economic conditions that impact student and institutional behavior.  
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Chapter Six:  Results 
 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 for institutions without a performance 
funding program and with performance funding version 1.0 and version 2.0 programs. 
Student body characteristics include total undergraduate enrollment and the percentage of 
undergraduates by four major ethnic classifications. Also included are the SAT and ACT 
test scores at the 25th and 75th percentile for admitted students, the percentage of 
applicants admitted, and the total dollar amount of Pell grants disbursed.  
Performance metrics assessed include the most commonly measured outputs in 
performance funding systems. These are the total number of undergraduate degrees 
awarded, year-to-year retention rate, and four-, five-, and six-year graduation rates. A  
variable was created to indicate the number of degrees awarded as a percentage of the 
total undergraduate enrollment to provide a sense of standardization among different 
institutional student body sizes.  
 Variables also were included to describe the annual level of funding provided by 
state appropriations in total dollars and as a percentage of all available revenues. 
Institutional expenditures are provided for annual measures of several discrete categories 
as defined by IPEDS, including Instruction (defined as total of all operational expenses 
associated with instruction), Research (defined as total operating expenses associated 
with activities specifically organized to produce research outcomes and commissioned by 
an agency either external to the institution or separately budgeted by an organizational 
unit within the institution), Academic Support (defined as total operating expenses  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Student Body 
Enrollment 10597.4 8617.4 9932.9 8214.2 10463.4 9621.5 
Asian Percentage 5.6% 8.5% 2.7% 2.9% 2.6% 3.0% 
Black Percentage 13.6% 20.8% 16.4% 24.0% 16.7% 22.2% 
Hispanic Percentage 10.1% 13.6% 4.3% 3.9% 6.6% 9.2% 
White Percentage 61.0% 24.7% 66.3% 23.2% 65.2% 22.3% 
SAT Reading 25th Percentile 463.2 54.3 456.3 56.6 450.4 49.5 
SAT Reading 75th Percentile 571.7 58.1 561.7 62.4 559.6 51.1 
SAT Math 25th Percentile 477.7 62.5 466.1 59.5 462.8 56.1 
SAT Math 75th Percentile 586.2 63.6 573.5 62.6 574.0 56.7 
SAT Writing 25th Percentile 450.2 89.3 445.3 67.4 436.8 52.2 
SAT Writing 75th Percentile 554.2 102.2 544.5 73.4 542.0 50.8 
ACT Composite 25th Percentile 19.7 2.8 19.3 2.8 19.6 2.6 
ACT Composite 75th Percentile 24.7 2.9 24.2 3.0 24.6 2.7 
ACT Evaluation 25th Percentile 18.6 3.1 18.3 3.2 18.8 2.9 
ACT Evaluation 75th Percentile 24.8 3.2 24.4 3.4 24.9 3.1 
ACT Math 25th Percentile 18.9 2.9 18.6 2.8 18.8 2.7 
ACT Math 75th Percentile 24.7 3.2 24.2 3.1 24.6 2.8 
ACT Writing 25th Percentile 7.4 3.6 7.0 2.9 6.4 0.8 
ACT Writing 75th Percentile 9.5 4.7 9.0 3.6 8.1 0.5 
Admittance Rate 66.1% 18.4% 72.5% 15.2% 70.4% 16.3% 
Pell Expenditures (millions) 13.1 $     12.5 $     12.4 $     9.7 $      17.9 $      13.0 $     
Performance 
Undergraduate Degrees Awarded  
Annually 1966.1 1871.5 1788.6 1768.7 1982.0 2240.1 
Degrees Awarded per Undergraduate  
Enrollment 18.1% 32.9% 16.2% 4.7% 16.7% 5.0% 
Retention Rate 74.5% 11.3% 73.7% 10.2% 72.7% 10.6% 
Four-year Graduation Rate 25.2% 16.8% 24.9% 14.9% 25.1% 14.9% 
Five-year Graduation Rate 42.0% 18.0% 42.5% 16.7% 41.6% 17.1% 
Six-year Graduation Rate 47.8% 17.0% 48.0% 15.9% 46.3% 16.2% 
Funding (millions) 
State Operational Funding 80.8 $     101.0 $   83.9 $     99.8 $     78.2 $      98.3 $     
State Financial Aid Grants 8.0 $      17.0 $     6.7 $      10.2 $     10.8 $      25.9 $     
State Appropriations as Percent of  
Total Revenues 27.5% 11.7% 29.9% 9.4% 24.5% 7.8% 
Endowment 142.0 $   507.0 $   218.0 $   732.0 $   187.0 $    446.0 $   
Total Revenues 393.0 $   674.0 $   376.0 $   673.0 $   423.0 $    748.0 $   
Expenditures (millions) 
Instruction 108.0 $   151.0 $   112.0 $   149.0 $   131.0 $    174.0 $   
Research 50.9 $     126.0 $   43.0 $     104.0 $   44.5 $      107.0 $   
Acadaemic Support 30.2 $     50.5 $     27.4 $     40.7 $     35.6 $      53.3 $     
Institutional Support 27.6 $     31.7 $     24.7 $     29.2 $     33.2 $      42.1 $     
Student Services 18.3 $     19.7 $     14.5 $     14.5 $     19.9 $      19.6 $     
Public Service 18.1 $     46.7 $     18.8 $     43.1 $     23.3 $      59.0 $     
Scholarships 14.5 $     19.5 $     15.0 $     18.8 $     18.4 $      23.8 $     
No PF PF v1.0 PF v2.0 
 18 
associated with activities and services that support the institution's primary missions), 
Institutional Support (defined as total operating expenses associated with the day-to-day 
operational support of the institution, or administrative costs to operate the institution), 
Student Services (defined as total operating expenses associated with admissions, 
registrar activities, and activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students' 
emotional and physical well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social  
development outside the context of the formal instructional program, for example, 
student organizations and intramural activities), Public Service (defined as total operating 
expenses associated with activities established primarily to provide noninstructional 
services beneficial to individuals and groups external to the institution, for example 
conferences and other forms of external outreach), and Scholarships (defined as total 
operating expenses associated with scholarships and fellowships treated as expenses 
because the institution incurs an incremental expense in the provision of a 
good or service). 
 The trend in number of degrees awarded is shown in Figure 1.0, which charts the 
average number of degrees awarded each year for institutions in states without 
performance funding programs and with performance funding 1.0 or 2.0 programs from 
2005 to 2015. As shown, there has been a general overall increase in the number of 
degrees awarded in all states regardless of the existence of a performance funding system.  
Interpreting the trendline for performance funding 2.0 programs is complicated by 
the outsized impact of adding new states to the category has on the average number of 
degrees awarded. When these programs were first implemented in 2010, only Ohio and 
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Tennessee had these systems and these two states averaged approximately 2,000 and 
2,700 degrees awarded, respectively. In 2011, Indiana, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania 
transitioned to performance funding 2.0 programs. Including these states in the 
performance funding 2.0 category dropped the overall average of degrees awarded 
because their higher education systems are significantly smaller, especially Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania which averaged only 1,200 degrees awarded in 2011. Accordingly, the 
graph in Figure 1 shows a dip in 2011 for average degrees awarded in performance 
funding 2.0 institutions, but as more states adopted the system the total average number 
of degrees awarded shows the same general increase as was occurring throughout the 
country in all institutions. Similarly, the noticeable increase in degrees awarded in 
performance funding 1.0 systems from 2010-2012 is largely attributable to the additions 
of Michigan and Virginia, both of which had average degrees awarded of more than 
2,000 degrees annually (2,800 for Michigan and 2,100 for Virginia) and thereby had a 
dramatic impact on the overall average of degrees awarded which had been 
approximately 1,500 before 2011. 
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Figure 1: Average number of degrees awarded annually in states with and without 
performance funding systems. 
Figures 2 and 3 show four- and six-year graduation rates for institutions in states 
without performance funding programs and with performance funding 1.0 or 2.0 
programs from 2008 to 2015. The starting point of 2008 was chosen because that is the 
first year that IPEDS began collecting the new uniform graduation rate data. Similar to 
the impact on average degrees awarded in performance funding 2.0 systems when 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania were added in 2011, the transition of Virginia from 
a non-performance funding system to a performance funding 1.0 system in 2011 heavily 
influenced the data because Virginia’s four- and six-year graduation rates at that time 
were 46 percent and 63 percent, respectively. These levels were far greater than the 
overall average rates of 23 percent and 45 percent for performance funding 1.0 states in 
2010. Aside from this, however, the average four- and six-year graduation rates tended to 
gradually improve for all performance funding categories, though performance funding 
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1.0 system institutions began to see a small decrease in their average graduation rates 
starting in 2014. This could be attributable in part due to the inclusion of Missouri and 
Utah in the category that year, both of which have subpar average graduation rates as 
compared nationally (e.g., four-year average graduation rates of 24 and 18, respectively).  
 
Figure 2: Average four-year graduation rates in states with and without performance 
funding systems. 
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Figure 3: Average six-year graduation rates in states with and without performance 
funding systems. 
IMPACT ON DEGREES AWARDED 
Table 3 lists the results of the models that analyzed the impact of performance 
funding systems on the annual number of degrees awarded. Model 1, which included 
only a dummy variable to indicate the existence of a performance funding 1.0 or 2.0 
program, resulted in no statistically significant impact for either types of programs.  
 The impact and correlation increased noticeably in Model 2, which introduced 
student body characteristic variables. Still, there is no statistically significant impact of 
either program on degrees awarded. Perhaps unsurprisingly, total enrollment indicated 
the most causal impact on degrees awarded, with an increase of 14.7 degrees awarded 
predicted for every 100 additional undergraduates enrolled. All of the demographic 
variables except for percent of white undergraduate enrollment were statistically  
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Table 3:     Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding Systems on Undergraduate 
Degrees Awarded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Performance Funding 1.0 37.79 38.51 9.252 21.58 
(1.02) (1.56) (0.26) (0.81) 
     
Performance Funding 2.0 -17.77 50.85 0.0384 53.29 
(-0.41) (1.66) (0.00) (1.58) 
     
Undergraduate Enrollment  0.147***  0.128*** 
  (9.01)  (6.00) 
     
Percent Enrollment Asian  563.9*  838.7** 
  (2.30)  (2.94) 
     
Percent Enrollment Black  -936.0**  -687.7* 
  (-3.27)  (-2.44) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
Hispanic 
 1041.4*  1317.4** 
 (2.51)  (3.16) 
     
Percent Enrollment White  -175.3  -147.1 
  (-1.23)  (-1.09) 
     
Admission Rate  -0.870*  -0.583 
  (-2.10)  (-1.44) 
     
State Instructional 
Funding 
  0.000000886 -0.000000463 
  (1.55) (-1.07) 
     
State Funding as Percent 
of All Revenues 
  -602.2*** -17.58 
  (-4.22) (-0.15) 
     
All Revenues   -3.32e-08 -7.70e-08 
   (-0.48) (-1.56) 
     
Instruction   0.00000271** 0.00000115 
   (3.01) (1.89) 
     
Research   0.000000524 0.00000107** 
   (0.87) (2.60) 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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significant, though decidedly less so than overall enrollment. While increases in the 
admission rate was shown to be statistically correlated with decreases in the number of 
degrees awarded, it was at the lowest level of significance. This could be because, 
although admission rates are a measure of selectivity, the rate itself does not capture the 
characteristics of the pool of applicants. Two institutions with the same admission rate 
but two very different caliber of student applicants would expect to see a difference in 
degrees awarded, which would not be determinative of the admission rate itself. 
 Model 3, which introduced funding variables instead of student body 
characteristics, showed an even more pronounced diminishing of performance funding 
program impacts as compared to Model 1, but still was not statistically significant. Both  
the coefficients and t-statistics for 1.0 and 2.0 programs were less than Models 1 and 2. In 
fact, the t-statistic was zero for 2.0 programs, indicating no correlation whatsoever. The 
amount of expenditures for Instruction purposes predictably was estimated to have a 
significant impact on degrees awarded. Curiously, however, the model predicted with 
strong confidence that as the percentage of state funding as it relates to overall revenues 
increased, the number of degrees awarded decreased.  
 Finally, Model 4 included both the student body characteristics and funding 
variables and again predicted no significant impact of performance funding programs on 
degrees awarded. Total enrollment and demographics remained a significant driver of 
degrees awarded, but admission rate was not significant. Similarly, state funding, total 
revenues, and amount of expenditures on Instruction were not significant, but 
expenditures on Research was found to have an impact. 
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IMPACT FROM CHARACTERISTICS 
The second set of models shown in Table 4 mirrored the first set but instead of 
analyzing the existence of performance funding systems replaced those variables with the 
age, or length of time, that a state’s system has been active and, relevant for 2.0 systems, 
the percentage of an institution’s state funding contingent on the performance funding  
system. Overall, the impact was only occasionally found to be significant and only for the 
percentage of performance funding. 
Model 1, which includes independent variables for only age and percentage of 
funding of the performance funding system, predicts no significant impact on degrees  
awarded. After introducing student body characteristics in Model 2, the impact of 
performance funding system age and percentage of state funding at stake actually 
increased slightly, but only was significant for the percentage of performance funding. 
The percent of state funding in the system was shown to have only a slight impact on 
degrees awarded. For every percentage of state funding included in the performance 
system, degrees awarded are predicted to increase by just more than two, with a level of 
significance indicated by a p-score of less than .05. Of all the student body demographic 
data analyzed, the total enrollment was shown to have the greatest statistically significant  
impact on degrees awarded, predicting 13.9 more degrees for each additional 100 
undergraduates enrolled. 
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Table 4:     Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding System Age and Percent of 
Funding Implicated on Undergraduate Degrees Awarded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Performance Funding Age 2.203 6.191 1.674 6.353 
 (0.41) (1.57) (0.31) (1.30) 
     
Performance Funding 
Percentage 
1.021 2.041* 0.854 1.945* 
(0.87) (2.41) (0.77) (2.01) 
     
Undergraduate Enrollment  0.139***  0.121*** 
  (9.00)  (5.63) 
     
Percent Enrollment Asian  565.2*  828.2** 
  (2.39)  (3.00) 
     
Percent Enrollment Black  -878.5**  -654.0* 
  (-3.20)  (-2.43) 
     
Percent Enrollment Hispanic  1057.8**  1311.4*** 
  (2.76)  (3.45) 
     
Percent Enrollment White  -151.8  -117.1 
  (-1.09)  (-0.89) 
     
Admission Rate  -0.864*  -0.535 
  (-2.09)  (-1.32) 
     
State Instructional Funding   0.000000745 -0.000000483 
   (1.33) (-1.09) 
     
State Funding as Percent of  
All Revenues 
  -575.7*** -24.31 
  (-4.18) (-0.21) 
     
All Revenues   -1.42e-08 -6.28e-08 
   (-0.22) (-1.35) 
     
Instruction   0.00000253** 0.00000112 
   (2.94) (1.86) 
     
Research   0.000000640 0.00000112** 
   (1.12) (2.73) 
     
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In Model 3 which examines funding variables, the performance funding 
characteristics’ impact on degrees awarded were again found to not have a statistically 
significant impact on the number of degrees awarded. As was the case above in analyzing 
the impact of the existence of a performance funding system, the amount of state funding 
as a percentage of all revenues was shown to have a sizeable and significant impact on 
degrees awarded, with a surprisingly negative correlation. The model predicted that each 
percentage of state funding was associated with 575 less degrees awarded. There also was 
a fairly strongly-associated correlation between degrees awarded and the amount of 
Instruction funding, though it was less statistically significant than the percentage of state 
funding.  
Finally, Model 4 included both student body characteristics and funding variables 
and predicted for the second time a very small, but statistically significant, impact of the 
percentage of state funding within a performance funding system 2.0 on degrees awarded. 
Model 4 predicted a slightly smaller effect than Model 2, with less than two additional 
degrees for each percentage point of state funding within the performance funding 
system. The other statistically significant drivers of degrees awarded in the model were 
total enrollment, research expenditures, and percentage of the undergraduate student 
enrollment who are Asian, Black, and Hispanic. 
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CONTROLLING FOR INSTITUTION SIZE 
 
To account for the relative impact of increases or decreases in degrees awarded at 
institutions with different sizes of undergraduate enrollment, these models were run again 
with a new variable indicating the logarithmic equivalent of degrees awarded replacing 
the previous dependent variable of degrees awarded. The results better controlled for 
disparate impacts of student body demographics that often are more pronounced at 
smaller institutions that typically are more homogenous and generally corroborated the 
lack of evidence for a causal impact of performance funding systems on degrees awarded.  
Table 5 shows the results for analyzing the impact of the existence of 
performance funding systems on degrees awarded as expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Model 1 indicates a minimal and not statistically significant impact of performance 
funding systems on degrees awarded. Model 2 introduced student body characteristics 
and likewise shows no impact from performance funding programs, but does indicate, as 
expected, a strongly significant impact of total enrollment on degrees awarded. This 
model also no longer shows any significant impact as a result of demographic makeup of 
the student body, suggesting that the logarithmic version of degrees awarded is 
controlling well for the disparate effects from different-sized institutions.  
 Model 3, which introduces only funding variables, showed just one statistically 
significant independent variable. The amount of state instructional funding was predicted  
 
 29 
Table 5:     Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding Systems on the Logarithmic 
Equivalent of Undergraduate Degrees Awarded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Performance Funding 1.0 -0.0131 -0.0120 -0.0228 -0.0125 
 (-0.94) (-1.05) (-1.78) (-1.19) 
     
Performance Funding 2.0 -0.0239 0.00804 -0.0268 0.00576 
 (-1.45) (0.63) (-1.61) (0.41) 
     
Undergraduate Enrollment  0.0000282***  0.0000270*** 
 (7.38)  (5.45) 
     
Percent Enrollment Asian  -0.510  -0.643 
  (-0.80)  (-0.96) 
     
Percent Enrollment Black  -0.253  -0.335 
  (-1.31)  (-1.65) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
Hispanic 
 1.117  1.200 
 (1.56)  (1.41) 
     
Percent Enrollment White  0.211  0.177 
 (1.77)  (1.47) 
     
Admission Rate  -0.000594  -0.000335 
  (-1.68)  (-1.03) 
     
State Instructional 
Funding 
  1.15e-09** 6.30e-10* 
  (2.79) (2.07) 
     
State Funding as Percent 
of All Revenues 
  -0.345 0.162 
  (-1.13) (0.62) 
     
All Revenues   -3.57e-11 -2.55e-11 
   (-1.37) (-1.25) 
     
Instruction   2.36e-10 -2.59e-10 
   (1.83) (-1.34) 
     
Research   -1.51e-10 7.43e-11 
   (-1.41) (0.64) 
     
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6:     Regression Results for Effects of Performance Funding System Age and Percent of 
Funding Implicated on the Logarithmic Equivalent of Undergraduate Degrees 
Awarded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Performance Funding 
Age 
-0.00162 -0.00123 -0.00148 -0.000332 
(-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.57) (-0.15) 
     
Performance Funding 
Percentage 
0.0000480 0.000609 -0.000149 0.000579 
(0.11) (1.82) (-0.31) (1.25) 
     
Undergraduate 
Enrollment 
 0.0000280***  0.0000268*** 
 (7.04)  (5.20) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
Asian 
 -0.503  -0.643 
 (-0.79)  (-0.96) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
Black 
 -0.266  -0.337 
 (-1.37)  (-1.65) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
Hispanic 
 1.140  1.236 
 (1.59)  (1.44) 
     
Percent Enrollment 
White 
 0.201  0.173 
 (1.71)  (1.45) 
     
Admission Rate  -0.000591  -0.000332 
  (-1.65)  (-1.01) 
     
State Instructional 
Funding 
  1.17e-09** 6.62e-10* 
  (2.79) (2.11) 
     
State Funding as Percent 
of All Revenues 
  -0.344 0.165 
  (-1.12) (0.62) 
     
All Revenues   -3.82e-11 -2.85e-11 
  (-1.48) (-1.42) 
     
Instruction   2.28e-10 -2.52e-10 
   (1.78) (-1.32) 
     
Research   -1.13e-10 9.59e-11 
   (-1.07) (0.81) 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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to have a positive impact on degrees awarded. In Model 4, which includes both student 
body characteristics and funding data, performance funding systems still did not have a 
significant impact on degrees awarded. Only student enrollment and state instructional 
funding were predicted to have a significant positive impact on degrees awarded, but both 
the magnitude and significance of these impacts were decreased by the existence of both 
variables as compared to the models that included them separately. 
Table 6 shows analogous results when analyzing the impact of performance 
funding program age and percentage of funding on the logarithmic equivalent of degrees 
awarded. Specifically, the models showed no significant impact of these performance 
funding characteristics on degrees awarded, but an expected positive and significant 
impact of student enrollment and state instructional funding on degrees awarded in each 
model in which those variables were included.  
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Chapter Seven:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
One major finding that emerges from this analysis confirms previous conclusions 
that there is a lack of evidence supporting the idea that performance funding in higher 
education positively impacts the number of degrees awarded. What this report further 
adds is that newer 2.0 versions of performance funding systems that implicate core state 
appropriations to institutions of higher education (compared to additional funding outside 
of core formulas that reward institutions for performance) also have not caused an 
increase in degrees awarded.  
While the existence of a performance funding system, whether 1.0 or 2.0, in and 
of itself does not seem to impact the number of degrees awarded, there is some limited 
evidence to suggest that for those states that have implemented a 2.0 system the larger the 
percentage of funding associated with performance, the greater the impact on the number 
of degrees awarded. This important, yet cautious, finding is at the heart of the initial 
inquiry of this report. There are several reasons that caution is prudent in this conclusion 
and more research warranted, however.  
First, of the 14 states with performance funding 2.0 programs, nine of them have 
implemented their programs within the last two years for which data for this study was 
available. It is not prudent to expect measurable changes in such a short time period, 
especially considering that a cohort of undergraduate students requires at least four years 
of treatment exposure to reach the measured outcome, degree completion. Accordingly, it 
is unclear how much weight we can give to the effect these nascent programs are having. 
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Indeed, if we remove these nine programs from consideration, four of the 
remaining five states with performance funding 2.0 programs actually transitioned from 
an existing 1.0 program. Two of these states, Indiana and Tennessee, first began a form 
of performance-based funding in 2003 and 1990, respectively. What’s more, Tennessee’s 
program apportions 100 percent of all funding based on the performance funding system.  
Accordingly, it is not clear if the percentage of funding within a performance 
funding 2.0 systems impacts degrees awarded because of its impact on an institution’s 
core state funding, or, rather, because the most longstanding program driving the 
available data is overwhelmingly based on this specific variable. In other words, the 
results of this report may be a product of Tennessee’s unique circumstances and not a 
generalizable aspect of that state’s program which could be replicated elsewhere. Future 
research will be critical to ascertain the effectiveness of performance funding 2.0 systems 
as the available data increases with the length of the programs.  
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